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The Financial Crisis in New Zealand: An Inconvenient Truth 
 
Abstract 
The financial crisis has been the topic of recent financial debate and the motivation behind 
initiatives to tighten the regulations governing the financial sector. In New Zealand the 
financial crisis reached its height in 2006. This paper traces the development of the financial 
sector in New Zealand from the early 1970’s through to the financial collapse of 2006-2009 
and the aftermath of regulatory reviews, finger-pointing and corrective measures that 
dominated the last three years to the present day. The paper argues that the financial crisis is 
the product of an inconvenient truth that has been legitimised over the past century, 
encouraged poor corporate governance practices, and that the knee-jerk reaction to correcting 
the regulatory framework is too-little too-late. 
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The Financial Crisis in New Zealand: An Inconvenient Truth 
 
Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2006-2008 has become a worldwide talking point and the subject of 
much debate in the financial sector. New Zealand has not been any less affected by the crisis 
compared to its other trading partners in Europe, Asia and the Americas. The current 
financial crisis is not the first to occur since the great depression of the 1930s. In the last 40 
years there were four of significance which affected New Zealand. These include the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997 followed closely 
by the Brazilian crisis of 1999 (Palma, 2004). Less than a decade after the last of these is the 
most recent crisis which overshadows all four of these in terms of magnitude and duration. 
For New Zealand the height of the financial crisis was reached in 2006 with a total of more 
than 40 finance companies going into liquidation or receivership, closed or placed in 
moratorium. The impact has been widespread but with particular severity on fixed income 
investors and property developers. 
The focus of this paper is to explore the financial environment of New Zealand and to link 
these to both the current financial crisis and the reaction that has been taken by both the 
financial sector and government regulators. The paper draws on data relating to failed 
financed companies in New Zealand between 2006 and 2010 and synthesises the commentary 
that has accompanied these failed companies. The theoretical framework is that of agency 
theory and is discussed further in section 2. 
The paper begins by providing a review of the Asian crisis of 1997 (section 1) in order to 
establish the context for analysis. Section three includes a review of the New Zealand 
financial market from 1970 through to the current period including the motivations that 
influenced its development over this period. Section four discusses the reasons behind the 
collapse of many finance companies in New Zealand. Section five discusses the reaction to 
the crisis by standards setters, regulators and treasury. The last section provides a summary of 
the findings together with the contribution that this paper makes to the extant literature.  
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Section 1: The Asian Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis is a forerunner for the current crisis and it provides insights as to 
the circumstances leading up to it. While there have been a number of these over the past 40 
years, the 1997 crisis is selected for its relative magnitude compared with the 1982 debt 
crisis, 1994 Mexican crisis and more recent 1999 Brazilian financial crisis (Palma, 2004). 
The Asia crisis has also been selected as its commercial impact on New Zealand are greater 
compared with the other three. The wealth of literature surrounding the Asian financial crisis 
allows for greater analysis of its cause, impact on the financial market and therefore any 
potential similarities to the current one. Much of the analysis that has been carried out to date 
with respect the Asian crisis draws on the information and discussion surrounding those of 
the previous two decades. In the same manner, the analysis of the financial crisis for New 
Zealand will draw on the case studies of its forerunners. 
The events leading up to the Asian financial crisis follow an unfortunate yet logical sequence 
of events. Prior to the 1997 collapse, the Thai baht was fixed to the US dollar at a rate of 25 
baht to a single US dollar. This initial exchange rate made Thai exports attractive to its 
trading partners leading to a balance of payments surplus (Sundaram, 2004). When the US 
dollar fell relative to the Japanese yen, Thailand’s export prosperity increased even further as 
the baht’s value fell in line with that of the US. Confidence in the Thailand economy 
ballooned to such an extent that Thai companies and banks borrowed US dollars to finance 
their activities and growth (Feldstein, 2003; Sundaram, 2004; Wade & Veneroso, 1998). This 
was done on the understanding that the baht would continue to be fixed to the US dollar. This 
understanding was supported by the Thailand government’s assurance that it would continue 
to support the US$ Thai-baht exchange rate (Feldstein, 2003). The economic performance of 
the Thai economy over this period created a false sense of security among investors and gave 
credibility to the government’s assurances. The circumstances necessary for a financial 
collapse to occur were now set in place and awaiting the catalyst that would trigger the 
bursting of the bubble (J. B. Taylor, 2008). The vulnerability in Asia was based on an over-
reliance on the fixed exchange rate between the baht and the US dollar. Revenue was 
typically denominated in baht while the foreign sourced debt was denominated in US dollars. 
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Increases in inflation in Thailand, fuelled in part by the economic prosperity of the previous 
two decades, lead to a fall in international competitiveness. The baht became overvalued. To 
compound the situation further, the US dollar was appreciating relative to the Yen. The 
current account deficit that increased dramatically deteriorated over the 1990s until it became 
8% of the GDP in 1997 (Feldstein, 2003). The Thai government attempted to support the 
value of the falling baht by using its own foreign currency reserves. These attempts were not 
sustainable and eventually the government was forced to float the baht (Edwards, 2003). The 
immediate effect was a fall in the value of the baht to 50 per US dollar. At this exchange rate 
the US dollar denominated debt effectively doubled, marking the height of the Asian 
financial crisis. 
Market Liberalization 
The economic circumstances surrounding the Asian financial crisis have been the topic of a 
number of research studies. Allen and Gale (2004) suggest financial liberalization leading to 
expansion in credit as a forerunner of the financial collapse. As evidence, they sight 
escalation in asset prices in Japan, Norway, Finland and Sweden in the 1980s, which was 
then followed by the collapse of the 1990. The liberation of the banking sector in Mexico in 
the 1990s, in the form of removing the reserve requirements led to a steep increase in credit 
creation for private borrowers and an escalation in asset prices. The period of high asset 
prices was short lived as a shift in the political climate marked by the assassination of 
Mexican Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March 1994, began a chain of 
events that saw stock and asset prices fall and the eventual collapse of the banking sector.  
Wade and Veneroso (1998) concur with this view in relation to the Asian financial crisis of 
1997. They suggest that the Asian financial crisis is not one of solvency but liquidity. 
“Creditors have ‘run’ on the currency and domestic assets, leaving the borrowers unable to 
continue to finance their loans. It happens partly because of excessive financial deregulation, 
including, above all, allowing firms to borrow abroad without any government control or 
coordination” (Wade & Veneroso, 1998, p. 5). 
Deregulation of the financial markets is a fundamental characteristic of the free capitalistic 
market itself. The capitalistic market in its purist form is consistent with few regulations 
allowing market forces to reach equilibrium. Soros (1999) suggests that the financial crisis is 
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a necessary consequence of capitalistic markets. “ International financial markets have served 
as more than just a passive transmission mechanism for the global contagion; they have 
themselves been the main cause of the economic epidemic” (p. 56). He adds that policy 
makers need to be aware that financial markets are inherently unstable and is more than a 
pendulum shifting backwards and forwards between recession and recovery, but rather a 
‘wrecking ball’ that swings from country to country destroying everything in its path. 
Bird and Rajan (2001) found that the banking sector and the implementation of financial 
liberalisation contributed to the Asian crisis by facilitating the conditions that lead to the 
occurrence of a currency crisis. They suggest that “a graduated and sequenced 
internationalisation of the domestic banking system is also a relevant part of financial sector 
reform aimed at raising efficiency” (p. 907). In an economy where the banking sector is not 
geared to identify and act on the long term implications of disparities between the current 
account, domestic interest rates, exchange rate regimes and international capital flows, there 
is little scope for relying on it to curtail the impact of a pending financial crisis.     
In 1986, Hyman Minsky introduced a Financial Instability Hypothesis to explain the 
incidence of financial crises. Minsky (1986) suggests that the elements responsible for 
creating financial instability are inherent in the system itself. He notes that in any open 
economy, innovation drives investors to move beyond hedging their investment portfolios 
towards financial speculation. Such behaviour is endorsed and encouraged as this leads to 
equilibrium. With the broadening scope of financial instruments and international capital 
markets, speculation is the driver of both speedy economic prosperity and economic collapse 
(Arestis & Glickman, 2002; Morris & Parrish, 1997).  
The response of investors to a pending financial crisis has been described as a self-fulfilling 
prophesy of the inherent in the financial market mechanism (Allen & Gale, 2004; Radelet & 
Sachs, 1998), The panic reaction by some investors to withdraw their money from the bank 
has lead to a ‘run’ on bank reserves beyond the levels they normally hold. Repeated instances 
of this happening have created a stabilising role for central banks and the government. This 
stabilizing role has taken on the form of the management of reserve to asset ratios, monetary 
policy, greater financial disclosure, and lender of last resort. These measures have largely 
eliminated the incidence of banking crises at the domestic level.  However the same cannot 
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be said of the international financial market. Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggest that for this 
reason, international financial markets are more prone to panic reactions than domestic 
financial markets. The perceived lack of coordination and mixed political agendas at the 
international level promotes the ‘mob psychology’ of withdrawing from a doomed project 
before you are left carrying the financial burden yourself (Allen & Gale, 2004).   
Emerging Economies 
Financial crisis and emerging economies are generally associated, leading to a view that 
financial crisis is a characteristic of emerging economies (Mishkin, 2003; Palma, 2004). The 
association is unfortunate as the capital flows, and flow-on consequences of a financial 
collapse is not isolated to the emerging economies within which they are seen to occur. 
Greenspan (1998) describes the recent liberalisation of international trade, new technologies 
and financial instruments as creating a global and interdependent financial market. He writes: 
There is a clear sense that the new technologies and the financial 
instruments and techniques they have made possible, have strengthened 
interdependencies between markets and market participants, both within 
and across national boundaries. As a result, a disturbance in one market 
segment or one country is likely to be transmitted more rapidly throughout 
the world economy than was evident in previous eras (Greenspan, 1998, p. 
244).  
 
The financial crisis in 1997, while identified as occurring in Thailand, impacted on the 
currencies and economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Estonia, Russia, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand (Wade & Veneroso, 1998). 
Emerging economies are characterised with a desire for economic prosperity that can be 
expected to be greater than that of its richer trading partners. Encouragement to expand is 
spurred on by multinational institutions including the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lim, 1998). These institutions promoted a liberal financial market 
without attention to the localised infrastructure to administer such accelerated economic 
development. Lim (1998) suggests that the emerging economies of Central and South East 
Asia, Latin America and East Central Europe have been used as showcases for the expansion 
of western free market models with little attention to the underlying culture and capacity for 
these economies to embrace such a model.  
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The desire for economic recovery and prosperity by countries classified as emerging provide 
an incubator for creating the circumstances that result in the financial crisis. The attraction of 
emerging economies to international investors is based on a number of drivers including low 
cost of labour, high returns, host government incentives and general enthusiasm on the part of 
the host country to receive foreign investment (Sundaram, 2004). Emerging economies are 
often characterised with relatively low labour costs. The relatively low cost of labour in 
emerging economies is supported by the stringent border controls on the free flow of labour 
from developing countries to the wealthy and developed. Multinational corporations provide 
a mechanism for overcoming the free flow of labour by establishing their operations in these 
developing countries (Eiteman, Stonehill, & Moffett, 2004). Governments of these 
developing countries encourage foreign investment as a means of addressing domestic 
unemployment and economic growth. The cooperation that multinational companies receive 
from host governments can take on a number of forms. These include subsidies, tax 
incentives, regulatory concessions and financial support. The result of this cooperation with 
an expected outcome that looks to benefit all involved is significant capital inflows into host 
country. 
Capital inflows were not limited to those through multinational corporations. Emerging 
economies promised higher yielding investment opportunities and a less regulated financial 
environment compared with many OECD countries (Palma, 2004). Foreign direct investment 
into these emerging economies continued leading to an escalation in domestic asset prices. 
The inevitable outcome of foreign investment is economic growth and fiscal surpluses that 
lead in turn to domestic prosperity, demand driven inflation and an increase in labour costs. 
This market reaction is entirely expected as it represents the well established model of 
demand and supply. Eventually the incentives that made foreign investment attractive begin 
to disappear in favour of other investment destinations. At this point, host governments will 
try and defend the economic stability of the country through managing foreign exchange and 
monetary policy (Baig & Goldfajn, 2002; Krugman, 1979). These efforts are temporal and 
may lead to a panic reaction on the part of investors who quickly realise the imbalance 
between foreign denominated debt and foreign exchange reserves. Some writers have 
identified these measures as a source of ‘moral hazard’ and ‘crony capitalism’ suggesting that 
governments exacerbate the eventual impact of a financial crisis by creating a false sense of 
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comfort for domestic and foreign investors (Arestis & Glickman, 2002; Krueger, 2003; 
Palma, 2004; Radelet & Sachs, 1998; L. Taylor, 1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998).  
Emerging economies provide good incubators for financial crises. Capital movements are 
relatively quick and not constrained in the same way as physical assets. Coupled with the 
speculative nature of the modern investment, investor confidence is important for financial 
stability. Managing investor confidence in an environment of instantaneous 
telecommunication leads to a commercial environment of volatility. A nervous reaction from 
investors may trigger a surge of capital flow out of the host nation with such a momentum 
that a credit crisis is immediately followed by a financial one. This has been the case with 
each of the financial crises of the last four decades. Emerging economies make good 
incubators for financial collapse because of the infant or weak financial infrastructure that 
they have when they are the target of foreign direct investment. Palma (2004)  suggests that 
the liberalisation that many emerging economies undertake for the sake of economic growth 
is often so sudden that it leads to the “interaction, on one side, of international financial 
institutions with very little knowledge of the institutional dynamics of emerging markets and, 
on the other, of still inexperienced domestic financial players” (p. 121). 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggest that emerging economies are prone to financial crisis 
because of their relatively low and volatile holdings of foreign reserves. The volatility of 
these foreign reserves, coupled with the relatively low levels that they hold, make these 
emerging economies illiquid following even minor shifts in capital flows. The case of Mexico 
in 1994, Argentina in 1995 and then Asia in 1997 are examples of how a shift in the direction 
of capital flows quickly escalates to speculation on the host currency which in most cases is 
pegged or fixed (Mishkin, 2003). The volatility in the foreign reserves held by these 
emerging economies is fuelled by panic reactions on the part of international investors and 
exchange rate management strategies by host governments using the very foreign exchange 
reserves that are in short supply.  
Exchange Rates 
Mishkin (2003) outlines a financial crisis in a emerging economy, as comprising of four 
stages. The first stage describes the deterioration of the balance sheet for many lenders as 
liberation of the financial sector is allowed to happen with the promise of financial prosperity 
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and economic growth. The deterioration of the balance sheet leads to the second step being 
currency crisis to be followed closely by financial collapse or crisis. Evidence from both the 
Latin American and Asian financial crises of the 1990s, show the currency crises that pre-
empted the financial collapse were preceded by financial liberalisation and deteriorating 
balance sheets. Deteriorating balance sheets create an environment for investors to speculate 
on the host currency leading to panic trading on the foreign exchange market. The economic 
policies that characterised the growth of international trade in the 1960s and 70s were not 
aligned with the financial climate of the 80s and 90s for speculators to place quick 
speculative bets on the financial market and thereby turn the fortunes of corporations and 
individuals around over night. Mishkin (2003)writes: 
In today’s world, financial innovation has produced new markets and 
instruments that make it easy for financial institutions and their employees 
to make huge bets quickly. In this new environment, an institution that is 
quite healthy at a particular point in time can be driven into insolvency 
extremely rapidly from trading losses as has been forcefully demonstrated 
by the failure of Barings in 1995, which although initially well capitalised, 
was brought down by a rogue trader in a matter of months (p. 108).  
 
Edwards (2003) suggests that foreign exchange rate regimes contribute to the build up of 
circumstances pre-empting a financial crisis. He writes: 
The currency crises of the 1990s have led economists to rethink their views 
on exchange rate policies in emerging countries. Specifically, these crises 
have many economists to question the merits of pegged-but-adjustable 
exchange rates, both in the short run – that is, during a stabilisation program 
– and in the longer run (p. 33). 
 
Edwards (2003) advocates that emerging economies should adopt a credible exchange rate 
regime that is not prone to volatility sparked by rumours of the currency being over-valued. 
He suggests that a floating exchange rate regime would prevent the occurrence of a crisis by 
allowing the exchange rate to correct for speculative capital in-flows driving up asset prices 
and subsequent capital outflows leading to financial collapse. 
Pegged and fixed exchange rate regimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s have been a 
popular way of providing a stable trading platform for companies involved in international 
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trade. These exchange rate policies, it would appear, were suitable for an international market 
primarily focused on managing the capital flows that tracked the path of international trade, 
but not the instantaneous transfers and capital movements that characterise the current 
electronic era.     
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was originally set up as a multilateral institution to 
manage the foreign exchange arrangements between trading nations (Krueger, 2003). The 
objectives of the IMF include encouraging free trade and assisting nations in the management 
of their foreign exchange which is assumed to be fixed but adjustable if there is a 
fundamental disequilibrium. The growth of international trade is encouraged by the IMF with 
mechanism such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that sought to 
remove barriers to trade. However when a country experiences balance of payments deficits, 
quantitative restrictions are permitted and used to stabilize the deficit although the cost of 
these measures is often more detrimental to the host country as in the case of Turkey in 1958. 
In the last thirty years, the IMF has been involved in the rescue attempt for many financial 
crises, particularly those involving emerging economies (Krueger, 2003). In the case of 
Korea, the IMF stabilization program is broadly divided into three stages. The three stages 
included the restoring of conditions that would return investor confidence, restructuring of 
the financial sector but foreclosing those banks that are identified as weak and lastly through 
management of the current account and the exchange rate. Restoring investor confidence did 
not only involve blacklisting those banks that were identified as weak but injecting more than 
$100 billion into the Asia as financial bailouts (Sachs, 1998). 
The IMF recognises the complexity of each case that it has been involved with and the 
potential for criticism should the programmes that it has been involved with prove to be 
counterproductive. In particular the different stages of lending up to a financial crisis require 
different stabilization programmes. The different stages of a financial crisis have been 
described by some writers as a twin crisis. A current account crisis leads to a credit crisis, 
which is then followed by a currency crisis and lastly a financial crisis. Krueger (2003) notes 
that the IMF’s efforts to address a current account deficit entails an exchange rate change 
together with a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy to curb inflation. A financial crisis 
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however requires the opposite in order to stimulate growth and stop the outflow of capital. 
Krueger concludes that “to a significant degree, in the presence of twin crises, whatever is 
done to address one will, in the short term, make the other worse” (p. 313). From this 
seemingly ‘no-win’ situation it may have been better for the IMF to not intervene at all and in 
so doing remove the presence of ‘moral hazard’ that some lenders have incorporated into 
their decision making on the assumption that the central bank or in this case the IMF will 
always come to their rescue (Mishkin, 2003). 
Criticisms of the IMF’s attempts at stabilizing financial crises have been widespread 
(Feldstein, 1998; Goldstein, 2003; Radelet & Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 1998). Sachs (1998) 
describes the impact of the IMF’s efforts at stabilization as achieving the opposite and 
actually fuelling both the speed and the extent of the Asian financial crisis. He writes: 
The IMF deepened the sense of panic not only because of its dire public 
pronouncements but also because of its proposed medicine – high interest 
rates, budget cuts, and immediate bank closures – convinced the market that 
Asia indeed was about to enter a severe contraction (as had happened 
earlier in Argentina, Bulgaria, and Mexico). Instead of dousing the fire, the 
IMF in effect screamed fire in the theatre. The scene was repeated in 
Indonesia in November and Korea in December. By then, the panic had 
spread to virtually all of East Asia (Sachs, 1998, p. 17).  
 
The stabilization programmes of the IMF, while good intentioned, are out of date, out of 
sync, and do not employ the existing political and economic infrastructure within each 
country in order to gain national acceptance. The ‘superhero’ image described by Sachs 
(1998) under minds local authorities who cooperate through a sense of desperation and fear 
rather than genuine trust. It is unclear whether in fact the IMF with their stabilization 
programmes add to the severity of a financial crisis or not. One thing that is sure however, is 
that they remove the opportunity for these economies to learn from the experience. 
The actions of the IMF mimic those of central banks and governments in trying to stabilize a 
domestic banking crisis. Evidence suggests that this has benefited the banking sector in the 
past. At the global level however, becoming lender of last resort creates a degree of moral 
hazard that encourages the risky speculative investment behaviour that prompt the chain 
reaction leading to financial collapse. 
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Monetary Reforms and Regulations 
The Asian crisis, as with those of Eastern Europe and Latin America, have provided a 
database and platform for financial reforms and changes to regulations in a global market that 
exists and operates in an instantaneous and electronic context. The suggested remedies for 
financial crises are varied and reflect the multiple perspectives of politics, economics, 
accounting and finance. The current study draws on the suggested remedies of Mishkin 
(2003) as a means of evaluating the occurrence and aftermath of the current financial crisis 
(2006-2009) for New Zealand. The choice to use the remedies of Mishkin is based in its 
coverage of many of the ideas proposed by earlier writers and because many of these ideas 
have been used in one way or another as an attempted means of managing financial crises. 
His breakdown of recommendations into twelve areas covers the complex and multi-
discipline nature of financial crises. A summary of his recommendations are noted below. 
Mishkin (2003) suggests as a way forward 
1. Prudential supervision 
2. Accounting and disclosure requirements 
3. Legal and Judicial system 
4. Market based discipline 
5. Entry of foreign banks 
6. Capital controls 
7. Reduction of the role of state-owned financial institutions 
8. Restriction of foreign denominated debt 
9. Elimination of too-big-to-fail policies in the corporate sector 
10. Sequencing financial liberalization 
11. Monetary policy and price stability 
12. Exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange reserves 
Section 2: Agency Theory and Corporate Governance  
Agency theory and corporate governance provide the appropriate explanations for the current 
global financial failures. The introduction of limited liability, allowing the general public to 
own shares in companies, has impacted the way companies are controlled. Shareholders (as 
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owners and also principals of listed companies) delegate the day to day decision making of 
the company to company directors (as shareholders’ agents, and company management). This 
leads to a separation of ownership and control which in turn leads to the “agency problem” 
that company directors do not necessarily make decisions in the best interest of the 
shareholders, and that the goals of the principal and agent conflict. The objective of the 
shareholders as a company is wealth maximization. However, in practice this is not 
necessarily the case as there may be a tendency for some company managers to pursue their 
own personal objectives.  This “agency problem” presents shareholders with a need to control 
company management (Solomon, 2004). 
Corporate governance, a mechanism of accountability is a strategy used by shareholders and 
other stakeholders in order to control company management (Dellaportas et al., 2005; 
Solomon, 2004).   Corporate governance is defined as “the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activities” (Solomon, 2004, p. 14). Solomon (2004) and Dellaportas et al 
(2005) observe that one reason ‘good’ corporate governance is linked significantly to good 
corporate financial performance  is its link with management quality. They indicate that 
better managers instigate better corporate governance, pay more attention to their 
stakeholders, manage companies more effectively and produce higher financial returns.  
However, corporate governance systems are vulnerable to abuse and may not prevent 
unethical activity by top management, yet they are a means of detecting such activity before 
it is too late.  This view is also expressed in the Higgs Report (2003). The role of independent 
non-executive directors in monitoring company management; the role of institutional 
investors as majority shareholders in influencing company management and taking an active 
interest in their investment, rather than remain passive observers; essential corporate 
disclosures especially financial accounting information; internal controls; the role of the audit 
function are examples of important elements of ‘good corporate governance’.    
Corporate governance failures have been blamed as the fundamental cause of the global 
financial crisis. For example: Inadequate corporate mechanisms, including transparency had 
accelerated economic deterioration in the key crisis countries (Suto, 2003); “a fundamental 
failure of the risk control systems at large financial firms which failed to pierce through the 
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lack of transparency in the complex structures financial instruments that generated excessive 
concentration of risk in the mortgage market” (p. 314) had led to the financial crisis of 
August 2007 (Lang & Jagtiani, 2010); the board of directors not performing the oversight 
role was found in the crux of the collapse of the global financial company, Lehman Brothers  
(Weitzner & Darroch, 2009) and the 2008 US financial crisis (Sharfman, Toll, & Szydlowski, 
2009); executives of major banks greedily focused primarily on maintaining their bonuses 
while the US economy was collapsing around them (Clarke, 2010; Lloyd, 2009) ; corporate 
governance not taken seriously (Rouse, 2009); minority shareholders having very limited 
influence over family dominated shareholding, and board of directors not independent of top 
management and not accountable to minority shareholders  have all contributed to the 1997 
Thai financial crisis (Persons, 2006; White, 2004)  . The list goes on and is not exhaustive.  
Section 3: Financial Regulatory Reforms in New Zealand  
The regulatory framework governing the financial market in New Zealand has developed in 
response to largely economic forces and the need to create an environment of confidence. In 
1969 finance companies and other financial institutions are required to hold a given ratio of 
Government securities. This is done to ensure finance companies hold a prudent level of 
liquidity and secondly as a mechanism for implementing government monetary policy. The 
required holding of government securities for finance companies is set at 5% in 1970 and 
steadily increased to 25% by 1980 (Deane, Nicholl, & Smith, 1983). By 1972, controls have 
been introduced to regulate the interest rate being charged and received by finance companies 
(Carew, 1987). In 1973 the New Zealand Government introduces the reserve asset ratio 
(RAR), requiring trading banks to hold a set proportion of their deposit in reserve. These 
reserves are held in the form of time liabilities in government securities. During this period, 
banks and other financial institutions (including finance companies) operate under an 
environment of interest rate restrictions. Variations in interest rates could therefore not be 
used to compete for deposits. The impact of this regulatory system is greater liquidity being 
held by the finance companies and banks. The reserve asset ratio also serves as a vehicle for 
implementing the government’s monetary policy and controlling private-sector lending 
(Singleton, Grimes, Hawke, & Holmes, 2006; The Reserve Bank of New Zealand staff, 
1981b, 1981c).  
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By the mid 1970s, the impacts of the oil shocks on the New Zealand economy are beginning 
to be felt. The focus of the then National led government is on economic growth and 
increasing exports to counter the escalating current account deficit. An era of deregulation 
follows in an effort to stimulate economic growth. In March 1976, interest rate controls are 
removed, allowing trading banks to compete for time deposits by offering more competitive 
interest rates (Carew, 1987). The Interest on Deposits Regulation which controlled deposit 
rates at NBDTs since 1972 is also revoked ((The Reserve Bank of New Zealand staff, 1981a). 
In an attempt to curb uncontrolled credit create through consumer borrowing to finance 
capital purchases, the government sought to directly control hire purchase contract by 
legislating a minimum deposit of 60% and a repayment term of no more than 12 months (The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand staff, 1981a). Furthermore, penal borrowing system was 
altered forcing banks that had breached the cash reserve requirement to borrow from the 
central bank (Reserve Bank of New Zealand) at penal rates of interest.  
Through to 1984, New Zealand has been operating a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Deteriorating balance of payments through increases in the international price of oil results in 
a series of devaluations of the New Zealand dollar but not to the extent that is needed. 
Foreign reserves have been depleted to such an extent that by the 1984 general election, the 
choice to float the dollar was inevitable. Coupled with the floating of the exchange rate, other 
financial regulations are lifted. In particular, interest rate controls, the reserve asset ratio 
(RAR) and other foreign exchange controls were removed in 1984. Lifting these controls 
moved New Zealand's financial markets to a more deregulated position than in any other 
country. New Zealand appears to have been the first country to remove all monetary policy 
(reserve) ratio controls on banks in the post-war period (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, & Teece, 
1996). In 1986 the Reserve Bank Act was amended allowing a greater number of banks to 
operate in New Zealand. The amendment also provided the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
with a supervisory framework. 
The wave of deregulation continued in 1987 with the lifting of many regulations governing 
financial institutions. Financial markets are deregulated and financial institutions are allowed 
to borrow from overseas. Banks are now allowed to compete on a more equal footing with 
other classes of financial institutions. Once financial markets are deregulated, the banks 
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expanded into lines of business in which their participation has previously been restricted and 
as a consequence a number of other classes of financial institutions are squeezed out of the 
market. Some of the larger building societies converted to bank status and operated in the 
same line of business as the traditional trading banks (Tripe, 2009). The deregulation of the 
financial markets led to a significant increase in the numbers of financial companies leading 
to increased competition and the need to diversify. Other financial players including non-
banks deposit takers (NBDTs) (who were not registered as banks) are free to provide 
whatever banking services they wished, provided they do not call themselves banks. The 
implication of the deregulated financial market is increased competition and greater option 
for customers to choose their financial provider. The seeds for financial innovation are now 
sowed and the new market framework would be an incubator for financial innovation and for 
trading in financial instruments. 
The negative consequences of a deregulated market followed soon after with the New 
Zealand stock market crash of October 1987. Many New Zealand companies collapsed 
including DFC, a major financial institution specialising in mortgage lending. During the 
same period many banks were pushed to the edge with confidence in the banking sector being 
brought into question. The New Zealand government responded to the collapse of JBL, 
Cornish, Circuit and Securitibank and Public Service Investment Society (PSIS) by 
introducing the Securities Act 1978. The Act required New Zealand finance companies to 
make greater disclosures to depositors and other investors (Singleton et al., 2006). The drive 
for greater financial disclosure continued and in 1993 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand also 
proposed to expand the amount of publicly available information about the quality of bank 
portfolios (The Reserve of Bank of New Zealand Staff, 1993). In 1996 private monitoring of 
banks by supervisors was replaced by a reporting system that required a defined set of 
financials to the public. The aim of the disclosure reforms was the protection of the financial 
sector as a whole while trying to reduce the cost of compliance. The revised system of 
reporting also has the objective of reducing moral hazard and promoting market discipline. 
The overall outcome of the reforms would be to alleviate the risk to taxpayers of bearing the 
cost of a bank crisis (Brash, 1995). The 1996 disclosure regime comprises of (1) the Key 
Information Summary for the bank and (2) the General Disclosure Statement which gives 
details on corporate information, financial statements, capital adequacy and risk exposures. 
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This regime required bank directors to take on the full responsibility for providing investors 
and other stakeholders with true and fair disclosures.   
The growth and development of the financial sector in New Zealand that followed was 
largely promoted by economic forces to grow international trade and encourage domestic 
economic activity. The National government of the early 1970s followed a tight regulatory 
stance and legislated for the control of inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. This is 
unsustainable and both the economy and foreign exchange reserves declined to an all time 
low. The new Labour government elected in 1984 immediately implemented a series of 
reforms to deregulate the financial sector and established Closure Economic Relations (CER) 
with Australia. The reforms mirror many of those observed in emerging economies in South 
America, Asia and Eastern Europe. The wave of deregulation was interrupted by the stock 
market crash of 1987 which prompted a tightening of regulations through greater financial 
disclosure. New Zealand adopted a philosophy of ‘let the buyer beware’ (caveat emptor) 
rather than regulating interest rates, exchange rates and inflation. 
Section 4: The Current Global Financial Crisis 
The current financial crisis is global and the impact continues to spread to all countries who 
participate in the international financial market. The trigger from the crisis has been traced 
back to the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis in the United States. In particular the housing boom 
that characterised the beginning of the millennium saw many consumers borrow for real 
estate and major consumer purchases secured by the high property prices. When real estate 
values then contracted, lenders, many of which were financial institutions faced imminent 
collapse. 
The circumstances surrounding the financial crisis were different to those observed in Asia, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. The most obvious is the absence of a developing 
economy. Previous financial crises were characterised with an emerging economy, initially 
experiencing significant capital inflows based on the expectation of high returns. When the 
debt servicing obligations of these foreign borrowers fell into question, investors began to 
withdraw. The outflow of capital away from these emerging economies required an 
alternative investment destination. The domestic real estate market appears a more secure 
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option and so the chain of events leading to the housing boom of the early part of the new 
millennium is set in motion.  
The real estate boom is not limited to the United States and in many parts of the world, 
including New Zealand, property prices increased significantly during this period as did 
domestic credit. Furthermore, financial institutions are interlinked and the activities of 
borrowing and lending to one another frequently occur across national borders. The 
inevitable outcome of these links is the domino sequence of collapses that then followed and 
continue to unfold through to the present day. 
The event that then followed with the Sub-Prime market crisis in 2008 could hardly be 
blamed on poor economic management by the governments of developing economies as had 
been the high-handed commentary from the West and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). With the benefit of hindsight, the current financial crisis is a reminder that the 
fundamentals of risk and return apply to all countries and industry sectors. 
The size of the current global financial crisis, while significant, is difficult to measure and is 
still unfolding. The collapse, or at the very least, the financial restructuring of major finance 
companies is a sign of the magnitude of the crisis. The $85 billion dollar credit facility 
extended to the American International Group (AIG) by the US Federal Reserve to prevent its 
otherwise certain collapse is also an indication of the severity of the crisis.  
The Financial Crisis in New Zealand 
The financial crisis in New Zealand is not a product of its own making. As with many 
countries participating in the global market, New Zealand experienced the flow-on effect of 
the financial collapse of large international finance companies including Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and AIG. Furthermore the nervous reaction of 
investors in the wake of these larger collapses has created further tension and a lowering of 
overall confidence in the market. As at May 2010, approximately 50 finance companies in 
New Zealand were marked as failed (see Appendix B). 
Poor corporate governance has been identified as a contributing factor to the impact that the 
financial crisis has had in New Zealand. The investment drive of the early part of the new 
millennium was skewed towards property and the financial sector in Zealand reacted in much 
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the same way as they had done overseas. In particular, steps to disclose and management 
portfolio risk is often overshadowed by the promised high returns.  
A significant number of investors in New Zealand are elderly individuals or couples saving 
for their retirement. Many elderly investors are not in a position to fully comprehend the 
magnitude of the risk they are getting involved with. Furthermore, as demonstrated later in 
this article, managers of these failed finance companies did not fully disclose to these 
investors, the extent to which they are exposed to risk following their initial investment. 
Some investors are unaware that the fund management practices which followed after their 
initial investment with the company are inconsistent to what they were originally led to 
believe. 
The length of time that many finance companies were in operation is inconsistent with the 
timeframe that investors expected. The timeframe for individuals’ saving for their retirement 
is medium to long term. The average lifespan for the fifty failed finance companies included 
in this study (see appendix A) is ten years. This average has been skewed by 5 finance 
companies with a lifespan exceeding 20 years. With a median of only 6.8 years and a 
standard deviation of 10 years, the lifespan of these failed finance companies suggests that 
the market response to those needing to save for their retirement has been a series of 
incompetent providers regulated by a cavalier institutional structure and framework incapable 
of delivering the desired result.       
The collapse of so many finance companies over a relatively short period of time cannot be 
fully attributable to an unfortunate set of circumstances beyond their control. To observe so 
many fail, suggests two possibilities. The first is that the international financial crisis wave is 
of such a magnitude that any company, big or small, diligent or unwise would have suffered 
inevitable collapse. The second is that the international financial wave is only moderate but 
that the financial companies in its path are vulnerable and prone to collapse. The analysis that 
follows explores these two possibilities and the reaction of financial institutions and financial 
regulators during this period. 
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Why so Many Finance companies had failed 
The failure of finance companies in New Zealand is not a new phenomenon as was seen in 
the collapse of DFC, JBL, Cornish, Circuit and Securitibank, and PSIS in the 1970s and 
1980s. The distinguishing characteristic with the current financial crisis is the high number of 
finance companies that are unable to weather the global financial storm that started with the 
US Sub-Prime market crash. There is little argument over the size of the current financial 
crisis and it is possible that finance companies that operated on the margin and therefore 
vulnerable to such financial shocks were prone to fail. However, the large number of 
collapses suggests that the financial climate was such that prudence together with a robust 
regulatory framework was absent when the financial crises reached New Zealand. 
The Registrar of Companies Neville Harris issued a report on his insights concerning the 
collapse of the finance companies between 2006 and 2008 (Commerce Committee, 2008). 
The report covered observations on the elements of the supervisory framework which were 
inadequate or “where it failed to address the risks inherent in the business model adopted by 
the failed companies” (p. 8). 
Corporate Governance and Poor Fund Management Practices 
Corporate Governance:  
Poor corporate governance has been identified as a leading cause of the collapse of many 
finance companies. In particular, a number of the failed finance companies were dominated 
by a chief executive who was the main architect of the company’s method of operation. The 
boards tended to lack the breadth of experience and skills required to oversee the scale, 
complexity and characteristics of financing operations that were undertaken. Too often 
directors were not adequately informed, misled or failed to take sufficient interest in the 
affairs of the company.  
The financial track record of many company CEOs and directors supported the notion of poor 
governance being the cause company failure. Some CEOs and Company directors have been 
associated with previous company failures within the financial sector. Bridgecorp founder 
Rod Petricevic was involved in the $250 million failure of Euro National in the late 1980’s; 
Michael Reeves of Lombard Finance and Investments Limited had a troubled history with 
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contributory mortgage schemes and pleaded guilty in 2006 to a breach of the Securities Act 
1978; Roger (Kenneth) Moses of Nathans Finance NZ Limited was involved in the failed 
contributory mortgage broking firm Reeves Moses Hudig. The fact that these individuals 
were allowed to continue operating, be it under a different company name, is indicative of the 
passive and ineffective nature of the financial regulation surrounding the industry. 
Treatment of non-performing loans:  
The treatment of non-performing loans is an exercise on financial prudence and ensuring the 
true financial position of the company is reflected. Without regulation to restrict or guide the 
treatment of these loans, most companies engaged in the practice of rolling-up a non-
performing loan into a new loan, that included the original principal and the arrears in 
interest. This resulted in the true performance of the loan portfolio being masked to avoid the 
classification of these loans as being in default. The disclosure documents of several 
companies effectively misled investors as to the quality of the company’s lending practices 
and performance because they reported low or nil defaults (Harrison J commented on such 
practices in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his judgment in the matter of the receivership of Capital 
& Merchant Finance Limited).1 
Lending practices:  
Lending to related parties has been used as a means of financing risky related party ventures. 
They have also been used to affect a personal benefit to any one or more of the directors. A 
number of the finance companies engaged in excessive lending of investors funds to related-
parties, often in circumstances where conventional funding sources could not be secured for 
the particular venture. In some cases, the Registrar of Companies observed that the only 
objective for entering into one of these transactions was to benefit one of the directors (or 
interests associated with the directors). In other cases related party loans has been used to 
prop up a poor performing investment. For example: prior to receivership, Nathans Finance 
NZ Limited (in Receivership) provided $171 million of debt to related company VTL Group 
                                                 
1 Judgment of Harrison J in the High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry, between CAPITAL+MERCHANT 
FINANCE LTD And Anor V FORTRESS CREDIT CORPORATION And Ors, CIV 2007-404-007298 [29 November 
2007]. 
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Limited, parties associated with it and various VTL franchisees from a loan pool of only $176 
million. Nathans Finance NZ Limited has only six loans to unrelated third parties totalling 
$5.3 million. The receivers of Nathan Finance NZ Limited have confirmed that the loans to 
VTL and its subsidiaries are unlikely to be recovered. The receivers of Capital + Merchant 
Finance Limited (in Receivership) reported that there were six (6) related party loans 
recorded in the company’s loan book totalling $37.6 million at the date of their appointment. 
The borrowing companies were controlled by Tallentire, Douglas or Nicholls individually, 
who were also on the board of directors for Capital + Merchant Finance Limited. Two of the 
related debtor companies are currently in the process of being wound up by the court. During 
the course of their investigations, the receivers identified a number of other loans totalling 
$41 million which contained “related party elements”. Of the total $41 million outstanding, 
only $1.75 million has been recovered with the balance expected to be written off. 
Concentration of loan risk:  
The concentration of investment portfolios within a particular industry paid little regard for 
diversification and exposed investors to higher levels of risk. Some of the larger finance 
companies relied significantly on the success of a single industry and/or a very small group of 
borrowers. For example the loan books of Bridgecorp and Lombard Finance Limited were 
heavily weighted to the speculative end of the property market. These finance companies had 
no choice but to continually roll over poor performing loans until the borrower’s 
development project could be completed. Bridgecorp’s single largest loan exposure was $50 
million invested in the yet to be completed Momi Resort project in Fiji. The Brooklyn Rise 
apartment development in Wellington accounted for almost 30% of Lombard Finance’s loan 
book. The significantly impaired $42 million Brooklyn Rise loan was part of a loan book of 
which 80% was lent to just five borrowers. 
Repayment:  
Faced with imminent default on their interest obligations, some finance companies continued 
to lure potential investors with promises of high returns through to the time they were 
declared insolvent. The Registrar of Companies noted that a number of the failed finance 
companies were in the end acting in a similar manner to ponzi schemes. In many cases, funds 
received for investment from new investors were used to repay the maturing loans of existing 
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investors. In these circumstances the companies continued taking in funds many months after 
their position was irreversible, thus exposing investors to immediate losses.  
Trustee supervisory model 
The trustee supervisory model is an important part of the corporate governance and operating 
mechanism for companies in the financial sector. In New Zealand, there are effectively five 
trustee companies, of which Perpetual Trust Limited (Perpetual) and Covenant Trustee 
Company Limited (Covenant) were the appointed trustees of at least 25 of the failed finance 
companies (see Appendix C and D). This degree of involvement raises issues as to the quality 
of due diligence at the time of their acceptance of the assignment, and in particular the extent 
to which they accepted a position of relatively weak authority as afforded to them by what 
were potentially ineffective trust deeds. The Registrar of Companies noted that Covenant and 
Perpetual were slow to detect adverse financial issues as they developed and were too casual 
and timid in their response to circumstances where investors’ interests were being put in 
jeopardy. The staff at Covenant and Perpetual did not appear to be sufficiently experienced, 
nor did they have an adequate understanding of the risk profile of finance company lending, 
to deal effectively with what turned out to be widespread failure within their finance 
company client list. 
The trust deeds outlining the roles, responsibilities and authority of the parties involved did 
not capture the arrangements necessary to protect the beneficiaries or investors. Given the 
risks the trustee companies were assuming and the activities they were engaged in, it seemed 
that the covenants in the Trust Deeds agreed between the trustees and some of the finance 
companies were too weak. In many cases, the Trust Deeds lacked a description of 
“enforcement events”. This left the trustees with insufficient powers to take action and a 
limited ability to intervene when solvency issues arose.  
Trustees were found to be in breach of their obligation to report on breaches or potential 
breaches of the deed. In accordance with section 11 of the Corporations (Investigation and 
Management) Act 1989, trustees are required to notify the Registrar of Companies (the 
Registrar) if a company has breached, or is likely to be in breach of the terms of a Trust 
Deed. In relation to the most recent series of finance company collapses, the Registrar of 
Companies maintains that notification (section 11 notifications) was frequently received on 
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or about the date of the appointment of a receiver. By then, the company was already past the 
point of no return financially, and little could be done in response.  
In recent years ownership of trustee companies have changed significantly and now bears 
little resemblance to the “institutional strength” the public perceive them to have. For 
example, Perpetual is wholly owned by NZX-listed Pyne Gould Corporation Limited, while 
Covenant is largely owned by a single shareholder, Graham Miller. Trustees Executors 
Limited is owned by US-based investment firm Sterling Grace Corporation.  
The accountability relationship between the trustees and those they appoint in an agency 
capacity is weak and in cases compromises the independence of the agent. In relation to the 
recent financial company failures, receivers are appointed by the trustees. Thus, it is unlikely 
that any shortcomings in the performance of a trustee company would be uncovered or 
pursued by receivers who look to trustees for further assignments. The Registrar understands 
that receivers are uncertain as to their standing to consider such issues. The outcome of this 
muddied relationship is that investors are left with no real avenue for examining the 
performance of trustee or to pursue redress for negligence in the performance of their duties. 
The role of auditors 
In the event of a company failure, the audit profession is among those that are brought into 
question. This is not unexpected as auditors are an important feature of the securities market 
supervisory framework. The association between audit firms and failed finance companies 
reveals a pattern that suggests the larger Audit firms were either not invited to become 
auditor for these failed finance companies or they refused to be associated with them. Based 
on Appendix C and D, it is clear that the ‘Big Four’ accountancy firms (Deloitte, Ernst and 
Young, Price Waterhouse Coopers and KPMG) were not extensively involved in the audit of 
the recently failed finance companies in New Zealand. KPMG was the only one of the ‘Big 
Four’ to act as auditor for more than one of the failed finance companies. The other three 
firms only appeared once in the above list. The significant concentration of audit 
appointments was within second-tier accounting firms including BDO Spicers, Staples 
Rodway and Hayes Knight.  
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The engagement of second-tier accountancy firms raises the question of professional audit 
competence. In particular, the allegations were that some audit firms did not have sufficient 
capability and experience to conduct the initial due diligence for the assignment and to audit 
such complex and elaborate company and business structures. This concern is illustrated by 
the action taken against the auditors of National Finance Limited, O’Halloran & Co, for 
failure to exercise due care and diligence and failure to comply with the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants’ technical audit standards. The auditors pleaded guilty to a breach of the 
Institute’s Code of Ethics and were ordered to pay over $130,000 for the costs of the hearing. 
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants is now looking at the audits of all failed 
finance companies. 
As a general observation, the audits of many of these finance companies lacked the rigour 
and analytical depth one would expect for entities managing substantial public investments. 
There is a view among receivers that if they had been rigorously audited, it is unlikely many 
of the failed finance companies would have continued in business for as long as they did 
Feedback from receivers suggested sub-standard audits were a component in the delay and 
demise of some finance companies. If auditors have issued qualified rather than unqualified 
opinions there would have been a stronger imperative for the trustees to step in earlier 
(Vaughan, 2009). Evidence of the weaknesses in the governance and supervision of the 
recently failed finance companies is the judgement of Harrison J in the Capital and Merchant 
Finance case (refer paragraphs 55, 56 and 58).  
Weaknesses in Financial Regulations 
Financial regulations in New Zealand have not been able to adequately capture the poor 
management behaviour that has resulted in the recent financial company collapses. In relation 
to financial disclosure, unlisted companies are not subjected to the continuous disclosure 
regimes required of those who are listed. The current practice for many unlisted companies is 
the filing of a prospectus (and any subsequent renewals) on a twice yearly basis. Where funds 
have been raised from the public, there is a view that some form of continuous disclosure 
model be required of issuing entities. 
The regulatory framework failed to capture the specific structure of organisations operating 
within the finance sector. In particular, the Securities Act 1978 required the presentation of a 
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prospectus for investment schemes defined under the Act. The Blue Chip property investment 
products were structured in a form to avoid being captured by the requirements of the Act to 
prepare a prospectus. Many investors were effectively locked into property linked to their 
investment despite the misleading and fraudulent promotional information that suggested to 
the contrary. These property and investment products were of a form that warranted a 
prospectus or equivalent regime. The Securities Act 1978 needed the scope to potentially 
include all forms of schemes that were in substance similar to those that were envisaged in 
the late 1970s and 1980s and not just those that fell within its strict definition criteria. There 
may be merit in allowing the Securities Commission to “call in” schemes, which on the face 
are exempt, and impose compliance with the Act. 
The moratorium pathway presents an unregulated and often ineffective step in settling 
investors’ claims on failing finance companies. Nine companies included in Appendix A are 
in a status of moratorium. The Registrar understood that investors in these nine finance 
companies have approved a restructure and or moratorium on repayments from maturing 
loans for a period of up to five years. However, there is no regulatory oversight of these 
moratoria arrangements and the management and monitoring of these restructuring plans is 
left with the companies, their trustees and affected investors. There is an emerging trend of a 
number of moratorium proposals failing to meet the forecast expectations offered to 
investors.  
The various moratorium proposals have been the subject of some criticism. In particular, the 
option to delay repayments in the hope that the proposed restructuring plan will stave off the 
possibility that investors will be otherwise left with nothing at all, appears a desperate attempt 
to moderate a situation that should have been addressed earlier. Furthermore, investors are 
left with little choice than to accept the compromised position of a moratorium, than leave 
with no money at all. In the case of Hanover Finance, the moratorium also acted to mitigate 
the possibility of litigation against the directors. The outcome is avoidance of accountability 
and inquiry that directors would otherwise face in a receivership or liquidation situation.      
Section 5: New Zealand’s Reaction to the Financial Crisis 
New Zealand’s reaction to the financial crisis has been a mixture of traditional economic 
management and free market low intervention policies. The focus of the New Zealand 
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government, through the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, has been to mitigate the impact of 
the global financial crisis on the economy and the current account deficit. The governor of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Alan Bollard, suggests the impact of the financial crisis has 
been comparatively less for New Zealand because of its primary sector export base and 
position on the supply chain for consumer goods that have been at the forefront of the 
economic downturn. He however acknowledges that our vulnerability is through foreign 
borrowing due largely to an insufficient domestic savings base (Bollard, 2009). Bollard 
argues that New Zealand’s recovery from the current global financial crisis and shielding 
from future crises will be enhanced by increasing the domestic savings base and thereby 
reducing New Zealand dependence on foreign sourced capital. 
New Zealand has not promoted the strengthening of regulations as the primary means of 
addressing the consequences of financial crises. The current regulatory framework governing 
the financial sector is the responsibility of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The idea that 
the Reserve Bank be the sole regulator of the financial system was agreed to by the 
government as early as 2005. Two years later in June 2007 the Minister of Finance finally 
made the announcement that this would be the case although it was not until September 2008 
that it would be made official with the passing of the Reserve Bank Amendment Bill (no.3).  
The implementation of the new regulations echoed the hands-off stance that the government 
had taken up to that point. In particular the additional requirements focused on further 
disclosures in the form of credit rating and documented policies on risk and liquidity 
management. The capital reserve requirement was set at 8% and 10% for credit rated and 
non-credit NBDT respectively.  
The reserve requirement for Banks is determined by a more complex formula taking into 
account the risk profile of the banks portfolio. This model follows the three pillar approach 
developed by the Basel Committee in 1974. The three pillar approach includes minimum 
capital requirements (pillar 1), a supervisory review process (pillar 2) and market discipline 
(pillar 3). The regulatory approach adopted by New Zealand focuses on the first of these and 
less so on the latter two. The current financial crisis however has brought to the forefront 
weaknesses in both the supervisory review process and market discipline for banks and 
NBDTs (Hoskin & Irvine, 2009).  
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Regulating the financial sector has targeted banks rather than the diverse group of operators 
that make up the financial sector. To a large extent the regulations imposed on the banking 
sector have worked well. However the same cannot be said of other non-bank finance 
companies, many of which have faced financial collapse through their own vulnerability to 
market shifts brought about by the global financial crisis and poor corporate governance 
practices. 
New Zealand’s management of foreign exchange has been one of riding the financial tide. A 
review of the balance sheet management strategies of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand prior 
to the current financial crisis saw a shift towards a low intervention management strategy 
including that allowed a greater degree of alignment with the market and reporting 
disclosures to match. In particular, the Reserve Bank allowed for a proportion of its reserves 
to be un-hedged. Furthermore, the recent adoption of IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards) in 2005 introduced a shift towards marking the value of financial instruments to 
market (Eckhold, 2010). 
The New Zealand government is not inclined to provide a bailout to finance companies 
suffering the brunt of the financial crisis in the same manner as the US in relation to $US 85 
billion credit facility extended to AIG by the Federal Reserve. However in October 2008, the 
Minister of Finance, Michael Cullen announced that the New Zealand government would be 
introducing an opt-in retail deposit guarantee scheme in an attempt to encourage investor 
confidence in the New Zealand financial sector. The folly of this scheme was brought to the 
forefront less than two years later with the collapse of South Canterbury Finance (SCF) in 
August 2010. The cost to the New Zealand tax payer was a $NZ 1.6 billion payout to SCF’s 
30,000 depositors. This was however, not a bail-out in the manner of that between the US 
Federal Reserve and AIG, but one where the New Zealand government had little choice but 
to honour its commitment as the guarantor. 
New Zealand’s management of financial crises since the 1970s has been one of education and 
disclosure rather than regulation. Mayes and Wood (2007) write: 
New Zealand is one of few countries that has reacted differently and argued 
that the solution to improving the prudent behaviour of banks lies not in 
regulating and supervising them ever more closely but making sure that the 
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stakeholders in these banks are aware of and are exposed to the risks they 
are running. (Mayes & Wood, 2007, p. 3)   
 
This comment is consistent with New Zealand’s current policy stance although certainly not 
absolute. Greater financial disclosure has been encouraged through the adoption of IFRS and 
the introduction of greater levels of reporting for banks and registered NBDTs. Regulations 
have been introduced although this has been targeted at banks rather than the wider financial 
sector. Regulation governing the financial sector has been and continues to be poised between 
the push for growth through reduced compliance costs and encouraging consumer and 
investor confidence. The outcome is a financial sector that continues to be only lightly 
regulated, an economy that is bent on foreign trade partnerships and a monetary and fiscal 
policy stance that is equally aligned with New Zealand need to be internationally competitive. 
How does New Zealand Measure up? 
The summary of recommendations outlined by Mishkin (2003) have been used here as a 
yardstick to assess New Zealand’s response to the current financial. Against the 
recommendation of prudent supervision (1), New Zealand has performed with respect to 
banks although the same cannot be said of NBDTs and other operators in the financial sector. 
Against the criteria of accounting and disclosure requirements (2), New Zealand continues to 
rank highly. The push for greater disclosures and the adoption of IFRS are examples of this. 
Furthermore, the greater level of disclosure is consistent with New Zealand’s approach of 
placing the onus on the investor to beware. The third and fourth categories address the issues 
of the legal and judicial system (3) and market based discipline (4). This has been weak in the 
case of New Zealand on two fronts. First, the market based discipline is inadequate to deal 
with financial operators who operate outside the boundaries of financial prudence and expose 
their investors to high risk. Second, the legal channels for enforcing the regulations that are in 
place are inadequate and slow. 
Mishkin’s fifth recommendation regarding entry of foreign banks is a redundant issue in New 
Zealand as new entrants have been few due to the relatively stringent regulatory environment 
for banks and small size of the New Zealand market to accommodate an additional banker. 
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Capital controls in New Zealand are a strong point. However this strength is skewed towards 
banks and registered NBDTs. Other finance companies in the financial sector operate outside 
these capital controls. The consequences of allowing such a large number to operating outside 
these capital controls is the high number of finance companies that have failed during the 
current financial crisis. 
State owned financial institutions are few in New Zealand and the entry of Kiwibank within 
the last ten years is a rare example of the government pushing for a domestically owned 
banker as an alternative to the current number, many of whom are foreign owned. Mishkin’s 
recommendation to limit the number of state-owned banks is based on the creation of a moral 
hazard where the state will not allow such a financial institution to fail. In the case of New 
Zealand, this is unlikely as the government’s management of these banks through the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand is sufficiently stringent to detect financial difficulty before it becomes 
too late. Unfortunately for other finance companies, this stringent monitoring was non-
existent and failure came often without warning to many investors. 
Restrictions on foreign denominated debt have not been an issue for the New Zealand 
financial sector. Unlike many developing countries discussed earlier in this paper, New 
Zealand has not been a target of significant capital inflows. The difficulty in the case of New 
Zealand has been the relatively small domestic funding base that it can draw on. Banks and 
other financial operators are often forced to seek capital off-shore as the domestic pool is 
insufficient. This has created a vulnerability to foreign market fluctuations as evidenced by 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the current global crisis. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, as part of its economic stabilisation policy has encouraged domestic savings to ease 
the need to seek foreign capital (Bollard, 2009). This is however a long term measure and is 
unlikely to address the short to medium term domestic capital shortage.  
The elimination of too-big-to-fail policies in the corporate sector is Mishkin’s ninth 
recommendation and is aimed at eliminating the maverick behaviour of large corporations 
operating under the pretence they will not be allowed to fail. This has not been the case for 
New Zealand although the depositor guarantee scheme provided an example of the potential 
cost to tax payers of policies that introduced moral hazard into the financial sector. 
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Financial liberalisation has been the theme of economic policy since the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The floating of the exchange rate in 1984 and relaxing of capital controls through the 
elimination of the reserve asset ratio are examples of this liberalisation. Financial 
liberalisation has been largely staggered in the case of New Zealand and coupled with greater 
levels of financial disclosure. However, this staggered liberalisation has not been uniform 
throughout the financial sector. Many non-registered financial operators were quick to take 
advantage of the relatively liberal market of the 1980s leading to the formation of many 
finance companies during this period (refer Appendix A). The moment for these new entrant 
firms has dissipated with the impact of the current financial crisis. 
Monetary policy and price stability (Mishkin’s 11th recommendation) has been and continued 
to be the focus of the New Zealand government and Reserve Bank. Such has been the 
importance of managing the inflation rate that it is included as one of the key performance 
indicators for the Reserve Bank. Monetary policy has been of recent loose with systematic 
reductions in the official cash rate (OCR) over the past 5 years. The relative shield that New 
Zealand has experienced throughout the current financial crisis has in part been attributed to 
the conservative and appropriate management of the money supply and inflation. 
The exchange rate for New Zealand Exchange was floated in 1984. Since that time the rate 
against the US dollar has range between 0.39US$/1NZ$ and 0.72US$/1NZ$. The Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand has maintained a hands-off approach to foreign exchange. This allows 
the market to determine the equilibrium rate without bulk purchasing or selling of the 
domestic currency so as to influence the rate as has been the case for many Asian countries 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.    
Conclusion and Summary 
The Financial Crisis in New Zealand has been a topic of much debate and controversy. 
Although the current financial crisis originated in markets outside New Zealand, the blame 
for the collapse of so many finance companies over a relatively short period of time cannot be 
entirely attributed to those foreign markets. New Zealand is merely one of many countries 
who participate in the global financial market and therefore vulnerable to the consequences of 
market shocks. The current financial crisis has however raised the question of whether or not 
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New Zealand’s financial infrastructure is suitably placed to weather the storm of financial 
crises as and when they occur.  
This paper suggests that New Zealand financial infrastructure has been the product of a 
relatively small economy trying to survive in an international commercial environment. 
Economic policies aimed at growth and free trade has overshadowed the need to develop a 
financial infrastructure to suit the growing financial sector. New Zealand’s approach to 
management of the financial sector has been passive relying more on encouraging the 
investor to beware rather than imposing regulations. Much of the regulatory attention has 
been directed at banks, and to a lesser degree, registered NBDTs. Many other players in this 
sector operated outside the narrow parameters of the regulatory framework. The large 
numbers of finance companies that have collapsed are the result of a weak regulatory 
framework governing non-bank financial operators.  
The relatively weak regulatory framework in the financial sector has allowed for poor 
corporate governance practices and therefore increasing the vulnerability of many finance 
companies to failure. The recommendations suggested by Mishkin (2003) have been used in 
this study to assess New Zealand reaction to the current financial crisis. The outcome of this 
assessment places New Zealand (at least in total) in a relatively strong position compared to 
other countries. However, significant weaknesses are evident in relation to the financial 
sector and in particular non-bank operators. The current financial crisis in New Zealand is 
more associated with finance company collapses than with unemployment and economic 
growth. While the economy as a whole appears to be successfully managing the current 
crisis, the attention to finance company failure is not unwarranted.  
There continues to the present day a segment of the financial sector that operates in an 
unchecked and vulnerable manner. It is a breeding ground for poor corporate governance 
practices, a trap for unsuspecting investors and a legacy of the free market model. Regulators 
have not been quick to stamp them out as they represent the purest form of the capitalistic 
philosophy upon which western capital markets have been based. The inconvenient truth is 
that this same capitalistic philosophy is the cause of the current financial crisis and the reason 
why regulations are introduced in a manner which is too-little-too-late.      
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 Appendix A - Failed companies Lifespan
Name of Finance Company Date Failed Incorporation Status in Lifespan Lifespan of Co.
Date May-10 Years Incorp post '80
National Finance 2000 1-May-06 6-Sep-99 Receivership 6.7 6.7
Provincial Finance Ltd Jun-06 11-Feb-89 Receivership 17.3 17.3
Western Bay Finance Jun-06 2-May-88 Receivership 18.1 18.1
Bridgecorp Capital Ltd Jul-07 6-Aug-04 Receivership 2.9 2.9
Nathan Finance Aug-07 7-Feb-86 Receivership 21.5 21.5
Chancery Finance Aug-07 8-Jul-02 liquidation 5.1 5.1
Property Finance Securities Aug-07 1-May-01 in & out 6.3 6.3
Five Star Consumer Finance Aug-07 2-Oct-98 Receivership 8.8 8.8
Antares Aug-07 23-Nov-05 liquidation 1.7 1.7
LDC Finance Sep-07 5-Feb-04 Receivership 3.6 3.6
Finance & Investments Sep-07 8-Jul-76 Receivership 31.2
Clegg & Co Oct-07 4-Apr-02 Receivership 5.5 5.5
Beneficial Finance Oct-07 28-Sep-72 moratorium 35.0
Geneva Finance Oct-07 19-Aug-02 moratorium 5.1 5.1
Capital + Merchant Nov-07 18-Jan-02 liquidation 5.8 5.8
C+M Investments (ex Blue Chip Finance) Nov-07 3-Jun-05 Receivership 2.4 2.4
Numeria Finance Dec-07 9-Sep-02 Receivership 5.2 5.2
OPI Pacific Finance Ltd Mar-08 13-Sep-99 liquidation 8.5 8.5
Boston Finance Mar-08 25-Mar-04 Receivership 3.9 3.9
ING Funds x2 Mar-08 28-Feb-02 suspended 6.0 6.0
Lombard Finance Apr-08 11-Oct-02 Receivership 5.5 5.5
Kiwi Finance Apr-08 13-Dec-05 Receivership 2.3 2.3
Tower Mortgage Fund Apr-08 12-Feb-02 closed 6.1 6.1
Cymbis NZ May-08 Receivership
Belgrave Finance May-08 1-Sep-00 Receivership 7.7 7.7
IMP Diversified Fund Jun-08 10-Mar-00 moratorium 8.2 8.2
Dominion Finance Jun-08 4-Feb-54 Receivership 54.4
North South Finance Jun-08 3-Nov-99 moratorium 8.6 8.6
St Laurence Jun-08 14-Aug-03 Receivership 4.8 4.8
Dorchester Jun-08 9-Oct-91 moratorium 16.7 16.7
Canterbury Mortgage Trust Jul-08 4-Sep-97 closed 10.8 10.8
Hanover Finance Jul-08 21-Sep-84 moratorium 23.8 23.8
Hanover Capital Jul-08 4-Aug-05 moratorium 2.9 2.9
United Finance Jul-08 20-Feb-01 moratorium 7.4 7.4
Guardian Mortgage Fund Jul-08 13-May-99 closed 9.1 9.1
Totara Mortgage Fund Jul-08 closed
AMP NZ Property Fund Aug-08 26-May-99 suspended 9.2 9.2
AXA Mortgage Bonds Aug-08 2-Jun-05 closed 3.2 3.2
Strategic Finance Aug-08 20-Apr-99 Receivership 9.3 9.3
St Kilda (All Purpose) Aug-08 Receivership
Compass Capital Aug-08 10-May-06 suspended 2.2 2.2
AXA 3x Mortgage Funds Oct-08 2-Jun-05 suspended 3.3 3.3
Guardian Mortgage Units Nov-08 13-May-99 suspended 9.5 9.5
Orange Finance Dec-08 3-Jul-03 moratorium 5.4 5.4
Mascot Finance Mar-09 9-Apr-84 Receivership 24.9 24.9
Compass Capital Mar-09 10-May-06 Receivership 2.8 2.8
Strata Finance Apr-09 11-May-01 default 7.9 7.9
Structured Finance May-09 15-Feb-94 suspended 15.2 15.2
Vision Securities Apr-10 18-Jul-01 Receivership 8.7 8.7
Rockforte Finance May-10 10-Jun-03 Receivership 6.9 6.9
Viaduct Capital May-10 8-Jul-04 Receivership 5.8 5.8
Average Lifespan 10.1 8.1
Standard deviation 9.9 5.7
Median 6.8 6.3
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Appendix B - Failed Companies 
Company Name: Date Failed Status
National Finance 2000 1-May-06 Receivership
Provincial Finance Ltd Jun-06 Receivership
Western Bay Finance Jun-06 Receivership
Bridgecorp Capital Ltd Jul-07 Receivership
Nathan Finance Aug-07 Receivership
Chancery Finance Aug-07 liquidation
Property Finance Securities Aug-07 in & out
Five Star Consumer Finance Aug-07 Receivership
Antares Aug-07 liquidation
LDC Finance Sep-07 Receivership
Finance & Investments Sep-07 Receivership
Clegg & Co Oct-07 Receivership
Beneficial Finance Oct-07 moratorium
Geneva Finance Oct-07 moratorium
Capital + Merchant Nov-07 liquidation
C+M Investments (ex Blue Chip Finance) Nov-07 Receivership
Numeria Finance Dec-07 Receivership
OPI Pacific Finance Ltd Mar-08 liquidation
Boston Finance Mar-08 Receivership
ING Funds x2 Mar-08 suspended
Lombard Finance Apr-08 Receivership
Kiwi Finance Apr-08 Receivership
Tower Mortgage Fund Apr-08 closed
Cymbis NZ May-08 Receivership
Belgrave Finance May-08 Receivership
IMP Diversified Fund Jun-08 moratorium
Dominion Finance Jun-08 Receivership
North South Finance Jun-08 moratorium
St Laurence Jun-08 Receivership
Dorchester Jun-08 moratorium
Canterbury Mortgage Trust Jul-08 closed
Hanover Finance Jul-08 moratorium
Hanover Capital Jul-08 moratorium
United Finance Jul-08 moratorium
Guardian Mortgage Fund Jul-08 closed
Totara Mortgage Fund Jul-08 closed
AMP NZ Property Fund Aug-08 suspended
AXA Mortgage Bonds Aug-08 closed
Strategic Finance Aug-08 Receivership
St Kilda (All Purpose) Aug-08 Receivership
Compass Capital Aug-08 suspended
AXA 3x Mortgage Funds Oct-08 suspended
Guardian Mortgage Units Nov-08 suspended
Orange Finance Dec-08 moratorium
Mascot Finance Mar-09 Receivership
Compass Capital Mar-09 Receivership
Strata Finance Apr-09 default
Structured Finance May-09 suspended
Vision Securities Apr-10 Receivership
Rockforte Finance May-10 Receivership
Viaduct Capital May-10 Receivership  
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Appendix C – Companies in Receivership with Accompanying Trustee and Auditors 
In Receivership Trustee Auditors
National Finance 2000 Ltd
May 2006 (and in liquidation)
Provincial Finance Ltd
Jun-06
Western Bay Finance Ltd
Aug-06
Bridgecorp Ltd PKF Chartered Accountants
July 2007 (and in Liquidation) & Business Advisors
Nathans Finance Ltd
Aug-07
Five Star Consumer Finance Ltd 
Aug-07
Five Star Finance Ltd
September 2007 (and in Liquidation)
LDC Finance Ltd
Sep-07
Finance and Investments (Partnership)
Sep-07
Clegg & Co Finance Ltd
Oct-07
Capital + Merchant Investments Ltd
Capital + Merchant Finance Limited 
Nov-07
Numeria Finance Ltd
Dec-07
Lombard Finance and Investments Ltd
Apr-08
Kiwi Finance Ltd
April 2008 (and in Voluntary 
Administration)
Fairview NZ Ltd (formerly BDO Spicers
Cymbis) Chartered Accountants & Advisors
May-08
Belgrave Finance Ltd
May-08
Dominion Finance Group Ltd
Sep-08
All Purpose Finance Limited
Nov-08
*NO PROSPECTUS
Covenant Trustee Company Limited O’Halloran & Co, Chartered Accountants
Perpetual Trust Limited Ernst & Young, Chartered Accountants
Covenant Trustee Company Limited Ingham Mora, Chartered Accountants
Covenant Trustee Company Limited
Perpetual Trust Limited Staples Rodway
Covenant Trustee Company Limited BDO Spicers, Chartered Accountants & 
Advisors
Perpetual Trust Limited Sherwin Chan & Walshe
* NO PROSPECTUS
Covenant Trustee Company Limited Hayes Knight Audit, Chartered Accountants & 
Business Advisors
Perpetual Trust Limited BDO Spicers, Chartered Accountants & 
Advisors
Perpetual Trust Limited BDO Spicers Chartered Accountants & Advisors
Perpetual Trust Limited BDO Spicers, Chartered Accountants & 
Advisors
Perpetual Trust Limited KPMG, Chartered  Accountants
Perpetual Trust Limited Silks, Chartered Accountants
Perpetual Trust Limited
Covenant Trustee Company Limited Hayes Knight Audit, Chartered Accountants & 
Business Advisors
Trustees Executors Limited PricewaterhouseCoopers
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Appendix D: Companies in Liquidation/Moratorium/Frozen Repayments, their Trustee 
and Auditors 
In Liquidation Trustee Auditors
Five Star Debenture Nominee Limited
Nov-07
In Moratorium/Frozen repayments Trustee Auditors
Geneva Finance Limited Covenant Trustee Company Limited Staples Rodway
OPI Pacific Finance Ltd Perpetual Trust Limited Sherwin Chan & Walshe
MFS Boston Limited Perpetual Trust Limited Markhams MRI Auckland
KPMG
Chartered Accountants
Hanover Finance Ltd Perpetual Trust Limited KPMG
BDO Spicers
Chartered Accountants &
Advisors 
Dorchester Finance Ltd Perpetual Trust Limited Staples Rodway 
Strategic Finance Limited Perpetual Trust Limited BDO Spicers Chartered, Accountants & 
Advisors 
Orange Finance Ltd Covenant Trustee Company Limited Grant Thornton 
Blue Chip 
* NO PROSPECTUS
Beneficial Finance Limited Covenant Trustee Company Limited BDO Spicers, Chartered Accountants & 
Advisors
BDO Spicers, Chartered Accountants & 
Advisors
St Laurence Limited Perpetual Trust Limited
North South Finance Ltd Covenant Trustee Company Limited
Northern Crest Investments Ltd
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